Suppose Alfie hits Betty. We would hold Alfie responsible.
Suppose Alfie throws something which hits Betty - that is, the harm takes place at a distance. We would hold Alfie responsible.
Suppose Alfie throws something and doesn't check that he's throwing into an empty space, and consequently it hits Betty. The harm was not strictly intended. We would nevertheless hold Alfie responsible.
Suppose Alfie throws something which hits something else, which falls on Betty. The harm does not flow directly from Alfie; nevertheless we would hold Alfie responsible.
Suppose Alfie throws something which hits another person, who stumbles into Betty quite heavily. The harm flows through another person; nevertheless we would hold Alfie responsible.
Suppose Alfie throws something which hits another person. This person was menacing Betty with a knife, and consequently stabs her. The harm was worsened by someone else's actions. But we would still hold Alfie responsible.
Suppose Alfie throws some sound waves, conveniently produced by his mouth, at another person. This causes the person to commit an act of violence against Betty that they may not otherwise have committed. Obviously, Alfie is 100% innocent of any wrongdoing.
Equally, you have to draw a line somewhere in the causal chain, otherwise we're responsible for everything causally downstream of what we say or do.
ReplyDeleteI think there are a couple of factors we generally appeal to in deciding whether someone's causal responsibility for x also entails moral responsibility for x:
a) whether x is causally mediated via another moral agent
b) whether x is an intended or foreseeable consequence of the action.
I'm guessing you realise all this, but then I don't really know anyone who would argue, for instance, that people shouldn't be criminalised for directly inciting violence because they aren't responsible for it (well, I've met one person who argued this, but he was a crank).